Genocide, Famine...just not high on the agenda
a primer on the conflict in Sudan
I keep thinking that I must have accidentally turned on a filter for the word “Sudan” in my news feeds. I was shocked by the Economist articles about famine in Sudan, and since then have set about reading everything I can find about the topic, which is bizarrely not as hard as you would think (am I spelling “Sudan” incorrectly or something?), and wondering why there isn’t more discussion about this.
This post will simply lay out in clear terms the basic state of affairs in a clear manner, as a prelude to more detailed analysis to come and advocating for more action.
I. Why care?
One estimate suggests there could be more than 2 million deaths by the end of the year and 6 million (“optimistic”) to 10 million deaths by 2027 (Clingendael Institute, Dr. Timmo Gaasbeek).1
Genocidal acts have been committed and are expected to continue, in particular if the RSF manage to take control of Al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur, where many have come for years to flee previous acts of genocide. (Le-Monde, UN HRC)
MSF reported that at one camp earlier this year a child was dying every two hours (source)
“far more” than 20,000 already dead, perhaps 65 thousand (source), or 150,000 (WSJ, gated)
10 million internally displaced; 2 million displaced outside the country (IOM)
“25 million people — more than half of the country’s population — in dire need of humanitarian aid. Of these, 14.7 million require urgent assistance for a range of life-saving support.” 80% of the hospitals in war-torn areas have been destroyed (source-WHO)
Extensive use of, and an ongoing risk of, violence against women (HRW)
The scale of the emergency is shocking, as is the insufficient action being taken to curtail the conflict. WHO Director-General, September 8, 2024
II. Wait, Sudan, didn’t that war end already?
Some might be familiar with previous conflicts in Sudan and confused about the relation to the current conflict. To recap:
The Second Sudanese Civil War ended in 2005, leading to the creation of South Sudan, confirmed by the 2011 independence referendum. The current conflict is not between Sudan and South Sudan.2
The War in Darfur (2003-2009, then simmering through 2020) has some related elements, but not the same. During that war, the Sudanese government armed the ethnic Arab Janjaweed militias against the ethnically non-Arab (Fur, Maasalit and Zaghawa) pastoralist groups (source).
III. What is going on?
Basically the war in Darfur led to the creation of two military powers within the Sudanese government, the traditional army (SAF), and the paramilitary forces that grew out of the Janjaweed and eventually became integrated into the Sudanese state under al-Bashir in 2017. These groups initially coordinated to depose al-Bashir in a coup in 2019, but the two sides split Sudan in a civil war starting in 2023:
Main actors:
The SAF: Sudanese Armed Forces “SAF” - under General al-Burhan (de facto leader of the country), stronghold is the east, northeast.
The RSF: “Rapid Support Forces” under General Hemedti, control much of the west and Khartoum, and much of the Darfur region (source). They receive some support from the UAE.
Roughly speaking, the SAF is dominant in the north and east while the RSF is stronger in the south and west including much of Darfur, but the capital (Khartoum), Al-Fashir (the last major city in Darfur still under SAF control, and many other areas are disputed. Unable to gain a clear military victory, both sides have been accused of war crimes and of blocking resources, including food, to try to pursue an advantage.
IV. What more could be done?
“We are consistently raising the issue of Sudan to top diplomats around the world and many times they make clear to us it's just not high on their agenda.” Alan Boswell, International Crisis Group (source)
A thorough look at what could be done requires much more in-depth analysis. But since some have suggested that the perceived difficulty of knowing what to do is a reason why little attention is being paid to the topic, I suggest some initial outlines of what might make a difference:
Increase aid: “The 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, which is seeking US$2.7 billion, is only 41 per cent funded by the end of August” according to UNOCHA. While some of the key areas are being blocked by the conflict, at the very least we should be doing more to fund aid to whoever can receive it.
Get it on the agenda. Attention to Gaza and Ukraine mean that “there’s limited bandwidth” according to Catherine Russell of UNICEF (BBC). If so, even slight increases in attention and advocacy on this issue could make a difference. Specifically, this can focus on pushing for a ceasefire, allowing aid and food to enter, (UN Security Council statement here).
Encourage third parties to reduce their support and arms. Russia, the UAE, Egypt, Iran and others have all been accused of supporting one side or the other (or both, in Russia’s case).
Increase support for refugees and displaced persons. More than 2 million people have fled the country and neighboring countries are in need of help (IRC, UNHCR)
What am I missing? Feel free to comment below.
Trying to evaluate the estimated famine deaths
Estimates like this are difficult due to lack of information and evolving situation of the conflict. Alex de Waal notes that on the one hand, previous estimates based on estimated calorie shortfalls over-estimated famine in 1984-85 by six times or more. On the other hand, he notes that the workarounds that prevented famine then (eating wild foods, migrating, etc) might be less plausible this time, in the context of war and lack of food in neighboring countries (source). And of course, even if 6 million is off by a factor of 10, that still leaves 600,000… I have written to a scholar on the topic for clarification and will perhaps provide a more in-depth discussion in a future post. Other estimates based on prices suggest that there is serious famine (level 5) in some IDP camps around Al-Fashir, and possibly risks spreading to other areas, but is less alarmist (FEWSNET, FAO).
That said, the SPLM-N, a splinter faction from the civil war that stayed in the north (unlike the rest that are in South Sudan) have been using the power vacuum to expand their control over territory in South Kordofan.